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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to present a cogni-
tive-behavioral model that makes it possible to 
explain the crisis situation (CS) in terms of in-
tense motivational involvement, and to propose 
a brief motivational intervention proposal in CS. 
The CS requires the person to implement coping 
strategies focused on the management of objecti-
ve damage, as well as on the search for emotional 
relief, a consideration that gives rise to the name 
of dual parallel processing in CS (DPP-CS). Brief 
intervention is understood as the involvement of 
motivational processes to enable the person to 
make decisions regarding emotional and instru-
mental coping which move her in the direction 
of emotional relief or solution of the crisis. The 
paper concludes with a summary of the three ba-
sic sources taken from the psychological literatu-
re to inform the design of the DPP-CS: the dual 
extended parallel process model, the cognitive 
theory of stress and coping, and the formulation 
by levels in cognitive therapy.
Keywords: crisis, motivation, cognitive therapy, 
brief intervention, coping.
Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es presentar un mo-
delo cognitivo-conductual que permite explicar 
la situación de crisis (SC) en términos de intensa 
afectación motivacional y sustentar, a partir de 
ahí, una propuesta de intervención motivacio-
nal breve en SC. La SC exige a la persona imple-
mentar estrategias de afrontamiento centradas 
en el manejo del daño objetivo, así como en la 
búsqueda del alivio emocional, consideración 
que da origen a la denominación doble procesa-
miento paralelo en SC (DPP-SC). La intervención 
breve afecta los procesos motivacionales, para 
facilitar que la persona adopte decisiones de 
afrontamiento que la coloquen en dirección al 
alivio emocional o a la solución de la crisis. Se 
concluye con una síntesis sobre las tres fuentes 
fundamentales procedentes de la literatura psi-
cológica, para inspirar el diseño del DPP-SC: el 
doble procesamiento paralelo extendido, la teo-
ría cognitiva sobre el estrés y el afrontamiento, y 
la formulación por niveles en terapia cognitiva.
Palabras clave: crisis, motivación, terapia cogni-
tiva, intervención breve, afrontamiento.
Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar um modelo 
cognitivo-comportamental que permita explicar 
a situação de crise (SC) em termos de intensa 
afetação motivacional e sustentar, a partir disso, 
uma proposta de intervenção motivacional bre-
ve em SC. A SC exige, da pessoa, implementar 
estratégias de afrontamento centradas no ma-
nejo do dano objetivo, assim como na busca do 
alívio emocional, consideração que dá origem à 
denominação dobro processamento paralelo em 
SC (DPP-SC). A intervenção breve afeta os pro-
cessos motivacionais para facilitar que a pessoa 
adote decisões de afrontamento que a coloquem 
em direção ao alívio emocional ou à solução da 
crise. Conclui-se com uma síntese sobre as três 
fontes fundamentais procedentes da literatura 
psicológica para inspirar o desenho do DPP-SC: 
o dobro processamento paralelo estendido, a teo-
ria cognitiva sobre o estresse e o afrontamento, e 
a formulação por níveis em terapia cognitiva.
Palavras-chave: crise, motivação, terapia cogni-
tiva, intervenção breve, afrontamento.326
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The aim of this paper is to characterize a 
crisis situation (CS) as a psychobiological state 
of a person in which motivational alteration is 
prominent due to the impact of a deep alteration 
of an emotional sort originated in some exter-
nal event of a harmful nature. We do not argue 
this to be the only relevant characteristic of such 
a state, but we do emphasize it with the goal of 
projecting, based on this concept, the charac-
terization of brief motivational intervention 
(BMI) in crisis situations.
In order to characterize CS, the label of 
dual parallel processing in crisis situation will 
be used. This concept has been used in the 
psychological literature particularly to refer 
to the parallel action of emotional and instru-
mental coping processes in a harmful situation, 
which determine the simultaneous presence of 
a pain-control process and a harm-control pro-
cess. These are not, however, the only two dual 
processes parallelly occurring in a CS; from 
other viewpoints, other simultaneous processes 
coexist as well which, together with the tradi-
tion of the concept in the literature, contribute 
to the justification of the name assigned to the 
proposed conceptual model. Such processes in-
clude: (a) the dual cognitive appraisal (the eval-
uation of suffered harm, and the evaluation of 
coping alternatives); (b) the simultaneous pres-
ence of fear and anxiety, which motivates escape 
and avoidance behaviors; (c) the relations be-
tween personal incertitude and situational am-
biguity; and (d) the simultaneous occurrence 
of processes of assimilation of the situation and 
accommodation to it, which finally lead to the 
attainment of new equilibriums, signaling new 
states of personal readaptation in CS.
The Psychobiological Nature  
of Crisis Situations
crisis situations
A  CS is a state of great psychobiologi-
cal alteration, of varying duration and stages, 
subsequent to the reception of a signal announc-
ing the event of a significant loss and the danger 
of a deepening of the harm that has occurred. 
The psychological alteration in a CS is manifest-
ed as a series of profound changes of an emo-
tional and motivational kind with significant 
repercussions on the person’s behavior (Salazar, 
Caballo, & González, 2007); the biological al-
teration is manifested as autonomic arousal of 
a nervous, endocrine, and immune kind (Dat-
tilio & Freeman, 2007), with repercussions on 
the health status.
The type of CS that is addressed in this pa-
per is defined by the presence of some harmful 
event that the person perceives as highly damag-
ing or as threatening to produce a lot of damage, 
signals that something really serious has oc-
curred and that something else might happen in 
an imminent way. These are crises that have been 
called circumstantial (Slaikeu, 1990), examples of 
which include the receipt of bad news (e.g., a dis-
ease diagnosis), the imminence of a significant 
economic loss, the death of a loved one, the oc-
currence of a natural disaster, or the presence of 
some event that the person perceives as a signal 
of the loss of something highly valued (as when 
the child interprets her first day at school as a 
sign of the mother’s abandonment and a sign of 
the risk of aggression in what is an unfamiliar 
environment for her). Circumstantial crises are 
severe situations that, generally, are unique in 
personal life, which is why there is small or no 
individual experience of coping, which increases 
the likelihood that they would occur as challeng-
es that exceed in an overwhelming way the po-
tential ability of the person to avoid or assimilate 
harm (Freeman & Dattilio, 2007).
As a psychological alteration state, a CS 
entails important changes in psychological pro-
cesses which influence the person to act in a 
relatively erratic manner, by means of trial and 
error responses that can get her closer or farther 
away from adaptation to the situation. Among 
these changes, we emphasize the following:327
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1. Intense emotional impact of a displeas-
ing type, characterized by the presence of psy-
chological pain that leads naturally to situational 
avoidance or escape (Gantiva, Guerra, & Vila, 
2011). This emotional state can imply fear, anxi-
ety, angst, sadness, or anger as well, but it can 
also imply adaptive challenging.
2. Confusion regarding the severity of the 
harm related to the event, with a predominance 
of representations of severe harm and a mag-
nification of personal vulnerability to potential 
negative consequences that might occur, or even 
with a magnification of personal vulnerability to 
new harmful events different from the one cur-
rently experienced (Clark & Beck, 2009).
3. Confusion in understanding the causes 
that led to the event generating the CS. Lack 
of clarity regarding the causes often leads the 
person to make distorted attributions of self-
blaming or blaming to others, with the resulting 
deepening of feelings of sadness and anger, and 
the alteration of social relationships.  
4. Emphasis on attention to signals related 
to the event or to the harm, with the emission 
of conditioned responses to such signals (Lovi-
bond, 2006; Mineka & Sutton, 2006). Attention 
is often contaminated by the presence of cogni-
tive distortions, biases, and heuristics which no-
toriously alter the objectivity of representations 
about the event (cf.  Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Conditioned responses are often of a negative 
emotional kind and involve instrumental re-
sponses of avoidance and escape.
5. Significant changes of a negative sort in 
the value that the person grants to events oc-
curring in other areas of her vital field different 
from the area of the CS generating event. This 
implies a notorious loss of motivation to act in 
other areas (Bradley & Lang, 2007), with an in-
crease in the likelihood of adding new losses to 
the one already experienced, such that there is 
an involvement in a vicious circle of self-fulfilled 
prophecies of a catastrophic sort. This change can 
be conceptualized as an important restructuring 
of the frame of physiological, psychological, and 
social needs that motivate a person’s actions, 
and it is an essential element to differentiate a 
CS from other situations of severe stress that do 
not represent a crisis as properly defined. Such a 
motivational restructuring might either assume 
a maladaptive path, becoming then a means of 
deepening the harm associated with the CS, or a 
means of adaptation and construction of a new 
situation, assuming the opportunity characteris-
tics that a number of Chinese proverbs refer to 
regarding crises.
6. Confusion regarding the interpreta-
tion of support signals coming from the social 
environment, which leads the person to ignore 
support chances offered by the environment for 
adaptation to the situation.
7. Confusion in the decision-making pro-
cess for coping with the CS generating event, as 
a natural consequence of the above mentioned 
alterations.
8. At an extreme at which emotional pain 
(absence of relief) and lack of clarity regarding 
the possibilities to cope with harm are predomi-
nant, a CS can lead the person along a path of 
extreme autonomic arousal where decisions can 
deliberately assume a path of self-destruction, 
further leading in both cases to an emergency 
situation within the CS, or in a more general 
way, the person’s situation can negatively evolve 
assuming characteristics proper of an anxiety 
disorder or an affective disorder (Barlow, 2002).
The conceptual psychological model of a 
motivational type here proposed to account for 
this psychological characterization of crises, 
from which further considerations for inter-
vention will be abstracted, has been called dual 
parallel processing in crisis situations (DPP-CS).  
This model is proposed here as an explanatory 
psychological alternative to what occurs during 
a CS. It has its origins in the research about the 
course followed by the processing of any emo-
tion (Martínez-Sánchez, Fernández-Abascal, 
& Palmero, 2002), but, more specifically, in the 328
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research about the impact of the induction of a 
fearful emotional state on the motivation of the 
person to modify her behavior, as well as in the 
research about the use of messages suggesting 
healthy action alternatives to the person, encour-
aging her to act from the fear or threat generated 
by the damages produced by risky behavior hab-
its, with the goal of fostering healthy lifestyles.
These arguments have been the subject of a 
large number of experimental analyses and cur-
rently represent micro-theories with large re-
search support, such as the dual process theory 
(Janis & Feshbach, 1953; Leventhal, 1971), the 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), and 
the dual extended parallel process theory (Witte, 
1992). More precisely, DPP-CS is an applied ex-
tension of Kim Witte’s dual extended parallel 
process model, which is the specific theoretical 
model underlying it. In this sense, in order to 
apply the dual extended parallel process model 
(Witte, 1992, 1998; Witte & Allen, 2000) to the 
understanding, explanation, and modification 
of a CS, a variety of factors highlighted by that 
theory need to be taken into account, in a pro-
cess approach that goes from the onset to the so-
lution of the crisis, such as will be analyzed next. 
These factors are represented in a schematic way 
in Figure 1.
onset of the crisis situation
The CS is initiated with the presence of a set 
of objective triggering stimuli. In the perception 
of these stimuli different factors are important: 
(a) the aspects of harm or threat to the person, 
with considerations about harm severity and 
personal vulnerability to its deepening; (b) the 
coping challenge that such stimuli pose to the 
person, with considerations about the availabil-
ity of efficient alternatives of action to cope with 
the situation, and trust in her own personal abil-
ity to implement the action courses that these 
alternatives imply. These two aspects of percep-
tion comprise the core of primary and second-
ary cognitive appraisals (Clark & Beck, 2009).
Figure 1. The dual parallel process in crisis situations (dpp-cs) model.
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Functionally, triggering stimuli in the CS 
work in a similar way to messages suggesting 
the imminence of very severe damage (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997); this conscious per-
ception is a necessary condition for the for-
mation of an emotional state leading to crisis.   
Differently to what happens with a warning 
message representing a threat and generating 
a basic emotion of fear or anxiety, in a CS the 
reality of harm is not a hypothetical event that 
might occur in the future unless the person 
adopts an avoidance behavior, but a harmful, 
objective, very aversive event that is currently 
occurring and can become more profound in 
the immediate future, producing a quite com-
plex emotional state of a negative sort. Func-
tionally, objective harm and aversion inherent 
to the set of CS triggering stimuli act in the 
manner of a punishment, which facilitates the 
person’s eventually interpreting them as such, 
and her engaging in speculations about which 
behaviors (her own and those of others) have 
produced the supposed punishment, with the 
subsequent emotional consequences of self-
blaming or blaming others.  
This interpretation of punishment is highly 
likely, but it may or may not occur during a CS; 
if it does occur, this interpretation becomes an 
evaluative element additional to the complex of 
triggering stimuli which determine the onset 
and evolution of the situation. What is inevitable 
is the interpretation of severe harm, a primary 
appraisal cognitive process, with the resulting 
emotional consequence of pain caused by the 
occurred harm, a pain that stimulates escape 
behaviors, and the interpretation of the threat 
of harm worsening, which stimulates avoidance 
behaviors. In other theoretical contexts origi-
nated in the dual processing model, such as the 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), this 
primary appraisal is called threat appraisal, and 
is operationalized in terms of the perception of 
severity and of the perception of susceptibility a 
person has about real or potential damages.  
The occurrence of the crisis-triggering 
event is not merely a stimulus informing about 
harm by means of a primary appraisal process; it 
is also a stimulus for coping responses to harm.   
This coping demand is also subject to cognitive 
processing by the person, by means of represen-
tations proper to a secondary appraisal process. 
The fact of being exposed to an aversive event, 
generally denoting important loss, occurring 
in some vital area of great personal value, natu-
rally urges the person to act to escape harm and 
avoid its worsening (Bradley, 2009); the course 
of action an individual adopts will depend on 
the margin of harm reversibility (in many oc-
casions, actually irreversible), on the responses 
repertory a person has available, and on the es-
tablished relation between those responses and 
the CS, particularly the ability the person attri-
butes to the responses to modify the situation, 
and the self-attributed ability to get involved in 
the performance of the response. In the theo-
retical frame of protection motivation (Rogers, 
1975), this secondary appraisal process is called 
coping appraisal.
Four different aspects in the analysis of 
secondary appraisal need to be differentiated, 
which have been the subject of study within 
cognitive theories of expectancy-value and so-
cial learning:
1. Personal beliefs that situations can be 
modified as a result of personal actions or that, 
on the contrary, they are subject to determina-
tion by external forces escaping the control ex-
erted by oneself; this factor is what Rotter (1966, 
1982), calls locus of control. As can be antici-
pated, people tend to be more active and exert 
more control initiatives in situations in which 
they consider the outcomes to be determined by 
their own actions, than when they perceive them 
as unchangeable in a fatalistic manner (e.g., the 
strength of fate), which leads to apathy.
2. Valence or valuation (Lang, 1995; Lewin, 
1976), the importance a person attributes to a 
determined element or outcome. In a CS, by 330
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definition, the event occurs in vital areas highly 
valued by the person (e.g., finances, health, work, 
family, etc.), which is why there is a high desir-
ability in obtaining a determined outcome favor-
ing the solution of the crisis. In a parallel manner, 
valences can be modified in other areas, which 
affects the general motivation of a person (e.g., a 
marital crisis can make the person underestimate 
success in other fields, such as the professional 
one, and to overestimate everything that could 
lead to the solution of the marital crisis).
3. Response efficacy, what Bandura (1997) 
would call outcome expectation properly, and 
that consists in the person’s belief about the abil-
ity of an action to produce a particular outcome 
(in this case, a favorable one to the solution of 
the crisis). These are expectations about the in-
strumental potency a behavior has as an efficient 
means to lead to a particular outcome.
In motivational terms, Flórez (2007) pro-
posed a distinction between reinforcement 
expectations and outcome expectations; the 
former refer to the immediate consequences of 
an action, which might become conditions lead-
ing to the attainment of the final outcome, but 
are not the expected final outcome itself. That 
is, reinforcement expectations refer, in moti-
vational terms, to wanted consequences (goals 
that approximate the final expected outcome), 
but not to the consummatory outcomes that 
are expected (superordinate goals). An example 
can help clarify this distinction: For a student, 
the fact of passing an exam can be the expected 
consequence that maintains her study behavior; 
but this conduct is not maintained only by that 
wanted consequence of passing exams (rein-
forcement expectancy) but by other long-term 
expectations, such as being a competent profes-
sional (outcome expectation or consummatory 
consequence of the studying behavior). In the 
natural sequencing of relatively simple behaviors 
that are chained to form complex actions, the 
consequences of complex actions (being compe-
tent as a professional) are long-term outcomes 
of the other consequences (having studied for 
satisfactory passing of the courses). This distinc-
tion, of course, acquires importance as long as 
there is objectivity and certitude in the relation 
established between reinforcement expectations 
and outcome expectations, in which case imme-
diate reinforcement is a real incentive leading to 
the outcome in the medium or long term.
This distinction between reinforcement ex-
pectations and outcome expectations acquires 
additional importance in a CS, in that a criti-
cal happening significantly alters the valence of 
a particular outcome, which in turn alters the 
significance a person will attribute to the rela-
tions between reinforcement and outcome. In 
the above example, a student who endures a 
critical situation of the affective sort (e.g., a rela-
tionship break-up) might be completely certain 
that studying helps her to cope with an immedi-
ate appraisal situation (e.g., an exam), but quits 
studying completely, regardless of the immedi-
ate consequence of the exam, as she starts to 
underestimate the importance of passing it since 
this fact has no influence at all on the solution of 
the critical situation she is going through (e.g., 
she might say to herself “what difference does 
it make to pass or fail an exam, if he’s leaving 
me anyway?”). There is, of course, a logical er-
ror underlying such self-statement related to the 
relations she is establishing between the premise 
(reinforcement expectation) and the conclusion 
(outcome expectation), an error that might be a 
due to a specific cognitive distortion, or to the 
use of some particular bias or heuristic (Clark & 
Beck, 2009).  
4. Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1997), the 
person’s belief about her ability to get involved 
in the performance of a determined action in a 
specific situation. Self-efficacy is the substantial 
motivational complement of response efficacy, as 
it is the expectation with the ability to empower 
the person towards the performance of an ac-
tion she judges will be able to transform, in this 
case, a CS. If self-efficacy fails, the person will be 331
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demoralized and it is highly unlikely she would 
be engaged in action, despite considering it an 
action able to transform the current situation. 
The highest levels of active involvement, leading 
the person to commit to and initiate the imple-
mentation of positive actions, can be expected 
in those cases on which high expectations of 
response efficacy and self-efficacy exist; on the 
contrary, the lowest levels of activity, with a pre-
dominant role of passive resignation and apathy, 
can be expected when there are low efficacy and 
self-efficacy expectations (Bandura, 1997).
An issue to which there is seemingly no final 
answer is that related to the temporal relations 
between efficacy expectations and self-efficacy 
expectations as factors determining whether the 
person would get involved in a particular behav-
ior. Bandura (2001) argues for the preeminence 
of self-efficacy expectations in the control that 
the person exerts over her own actions, and for 
this reason these are the expectations that, in his 
view, prevail as determining factors of the agency 
a person exerts on her activity in general. Nev-
ertheless, this preeminence of the self-efficacy 
expectation is questionable, particularly in the 
case of behaviors approximating a superordinate 
goal in which a logical coherence between rein-
forcement expectation and outcome expectation 
must be anticipated. Witte (1992), in her proposal 
of dual extended parallel process model, argues 
that response efficacy (outcome expectation) is 
the preeminent factor determining that a coping 
action will assume the course of the control pro-
cess for objective harm and will not stay only at 
the level of emotional control action, which is a 
course of defensive motivation characteristic of 
the control process of subjective fear.  
In the present proposal of DPP-CS we ad-
here to Witte’s view, as will be analyzed later, 
because this proposal solves some logical and 
methodological problems that have been stated 
by previous versions about dual processing and 
its motivational impact. Certainly, efficacy ex-
pectations, both of response and of the person’s 
own ability, play a central role in the mainte-
nance of the motivational process leading the 
person to initiate and stay committed to the 
implementation of a particular course of action, 
in this case a course of action that might lead 
to the solution of the crisis, whether by way of 
emotional coping, of instrumental coping, or of 
both, as suggested in the following proposal.
In addition, the very interpretation the per-
son makes regarding the reaction of emotional 
pain produced by the harmful event triggering 
the crisis, as well as the interpretation about its 
management, might generate diverging evolu-
tionary courses of the CS, such as emergency 
states, anxiety disorders, and/or affective dis-
orders. This occurs when transforming the ob-
jective perception of the pain generated by the 
damage —which allows for options of personal 
management with or without therapeutic sup-
port—, changing it into a subjective perception 
of intense suffering. This emotional reaction in 
the face of which the individual cannot con-
template efficient options of personal manage-
ment, requires the implementation of priority 
attention, or special emergency intervention, 
occasionally called crisis intervention, but which 
is in reality an urgency intervention to the ag-
gravation of the crisis caused by the emotional 
reaction of intense suffering, which the person 
interprets as an inescapable and unavoidable 
event. Crisis intervention, even if brief, is broad-
er and more lasting, encompassing all the time 
and factors inherent to the crisis (Slaikeu, 1990), 
whereas emergency intervention is more re-
stricted in time and covers only some selective 
aspects of the crisis, such as the consequences of 
acute biological harm, or the behavioral conse-
quences expressed in acts of aggression to others 
or self-aggression, as in suicide. Furthermore, 
other interventions different from crisis inter-
vention can be the most appropriate in cases 
where the crisis sets the stage for an anxiety dis-
order (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder) or an 
affective disorder (e.g., depression).332
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cognitive Appraisal during the crisis 
situation Understood as severe stress
A CS has all of the characteristics of a state 
of severe stress, although not every stress state 
can be considered a crisis. In the conceptualiza-
tion of crisis on the basis of the dual parallel pro-
cess model, focused on the control of harm and 
the control of the emotional state, two aspects 
are particularly important regarding consider-
ations about stress: cognitive appraisal and bio-
logical impact. These two aspects are especially 
important because of their implications about 
the elements that should be emphasized when 
implementing an intervention in CS.
Regarding the role of cognitive appraisal, 
the viewpoint that we adhere to in the proposal of 
DPP-CS is that of Lazarus and Folkman (1984a, 
1984b), related to the functions of cognitive ap-
praisal in the stress response. Lazarus and Folk-
man’s cognitive approach conceptualizes stress as 
an interaction between external stimuli and the 
person’s interpretation of them, which partially ex-
plains why reactions to one stimulus can vary a lot. 
Personal interpretation of a situation triggering a 
crisis can be understood in the frame of the evalu-
ations these authors consider as stressful, such as 
appraisals of harm or loss, threat, and challenge.
A CS demands coping, which is why the per-
son is faced with the need to find alternatives of 
action; this quest for alternatives is pressing, par-
ticularly when the interpretation of threat brings 
about anxiety, or the interpretation of challenge 
generates a challenge perception, stimulating in 
both cases the search for avoidance responses 
that prevent the worsening of harm or the influx 
of new harms additional to the one already ex-
perienced by the person. In this search, as stated 
before, the appraisal of the efficacy of available 
response alternatives (outcome expectation) 
and that of the self-ability to perform them in a 
satisfactory way (self-efficacy expectation) are 
predominant. These two types of appraisal con-
stitute, according to Lazarus and Folkman, the 
essence of secondary appraisal in stress situations.
Some factors, both personal and situation-
al, influence the determination of the develop-
ment of primary and secondary appraisal, and 
also of reappraisal; among the personal factors, 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984b) have proposed 
commitment and beliefs; among situational fac-
tors, novelty, predictability, and event incerti-
tude, as well as temporal factors, are particularly 
important. An additional aspect is that related 
to the chronology of the events. These aspects 
contribute to modifying the dynamics of the 
relation between personal incertitude and situ-
ation ambiguity, significantly affecting the sig-
nificance a person attributes to the critical event, 
and the course that coping with it will take, thus 
demanding a special analysis when implement-
ing an intervention in a CS (Lazarus & Lazarus, 
1994). These authors characterize such factors in 
the following terms:
1. Commitment. In a CS, by definition, there 
is great personal commitment to what is at stake; 
this commitment is expressed in the high rank 
of importance that what is at stake has for the 
individual as a core theme of the crisis (e.g., a 
sentimental relationship, finances, the life of 
a loved one, or one’s own, etc.), which config-
ures a favorable context for the occurrence of 
appraisals attributing high severity and vulner-
ability to loss or harm and lead to an extraor-
dinary sensitization, which makes the person 
pay excessive attention to any signal related to 
the crisis, interpreting it in quite different ways 
which can beget very diverse emotional states.   
Commitment determines the high motivational 
relevance (Martínez-Sánchez et al., 2002) and 
subsequent responsibility a person assumes in a 
CS. A favorable consequence of this high extent 
of commitment and responsibility is that it also 
leads the person to actively reduce the threat and 
to maintain the effort during coping, a central, 
motivational aspect favoring the impact of an 
intervention, regardless of how brief it is.
2.  Beliefs. These are ideas or conceptual 
schemata a person uses to interpret reality.  The 333
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world, in this case the CS, is what a person per-
ceives about it, and to what extent it affects her. 
These are very diverse beliefs, some very general, 
which can encompass all aspects of a person’s 
life, and others more specific and restricted to 
those aspects related to the CS. Both types are 
learned throughout the course of life, and in 
their formation the personal experience in the 
particular socio-cultural environment where the 
person has grown up plays a very important role.
Attributional cognitive theory (Weiner, 1985) 
differentiates between appraisals of control at-
tributed to external causes or to internal causes, 
which combine with appraisals about the modi-
fiability of such causes (i.e., modifiable versus 
non-modifiable). Attributions to modifiable 
causes, depending on the easiness or difficulty 
attributed to the control of such causes, gener-
ate a higher propensity to adopting an initiative 
on the management of the situation. An increas-
ingly influential current approach in psychology, 
emphasizing the importance of fostering general 
beliefs favorable to personal growth, is that of 
positive psychology (Seligman, Steen, Park, & 
Peterson, 2005). In general, cognitive theories 
of personality underscore the role of global sys-
tems of individual belief as a determinant fac-
tor of the consistencies occurring in the way an 
individual is behaving in very diverse aspects 
of her life; these belief systems have been called 
cognitive-affective processing systems (CAPS; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Other general beliefs, not referring to psy-
chological aspects but rather to ideological as-
pects, are existential beliefs, such as religious 
beliefs; in a CS, these existential beliefs acquire 
a very clear function of emotional and motiva-
tional determination, by suggesting explanatory 
alternatives about the meaning of the experi-
enced event, and about the meaning a person 
can attribute to coping with it (e.g., accepting 
the situation as sign of divine will). The role of 
beliefs of all kind, particularly that of existen-
tial beliefs, is more evident and ostensible when 
indicating to the individual what is acceptable in 
the search for adaptation in those cases where 
high-impact, acute changes in life are imminent, 
a characteristic fact in any CS.
Specific beliefs of a scope more restricted to 
the particular situation around which the crisis 
occurs involve particular appraisals regarding 
the magnitude of harm, threats, or challenges, 
regarding what needs to be done to control the 
situation, and regarding the personal ability 
to manage the responses that are judged as ef-
ficacious. These beliefs were mentioned before 
as related to outcome expectations and self-ef-
ficacy expectations. A cognitive aspect of par-
ticular relevance in this case is that referred to 
incertitude or clarity about those two expecta-
tions permanently interacting to determine the 
subsequent motivational course that the cop-
ing process will take, whether in the direction 
of control of the subjective emotion, or control 
of the objective harm.  What specific harm 
should be controlled in the crisis generated by 
the death of a loved one? What is the threat of 
additional harm that might occur? What can be 
done in such a situation? Is what can be done 
acceptable? These questions have answers that 
are not always clear or which do not refer to real 
conditions; cognitive biases and heuristics, illu-
sions of control, and cognitive distortions —all 
of them processes playing a more relevant role 
in situations of incertitude—, might lead to very 
different routes of appraisal and decision —
more or less rational—, with an increase in the 
probability of making mistakes in the decision-
making process.
3. Novelty, predictability, and temporal in-
certitude. These are situational characteristics 
that mediate the degree of threat a situation rep-
resents to the person, regarding the interpreta-
tions she might make. Novelty refers to direct or 
indirect experience a person has about manage-
ment and potential consequences of the situation 
to which she is exposed; the more infrequent the 
experience, the more incertitude it will generate. 334
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Predictability refers to the presence of stimuli 
that signal to the person what the probability of 
occurrence of aversive events to which she is ex-
posed is (Mineka & Sutton, 2006). This requires 
pinpointing what these events are, as general 
ideas about the critical event do not necessarily 
express the specific conditions of that event that 
are acting to bring about the emotional response.  
For example, a big economic loss might 
result in something too painful, signaling a CS, 
but it is also too general in itself to account for 
concrete threats, such as worries about daily 
expenses, payments of debts, or saving a valu-
able item at risk of being lost, three different as-
pects occurring simultaneously in the situation 
configuring the crisis. If it is about the anxiety 
generated by the threat of losing a valuable item 
in the case of failure to pay a debt, the proxim-
ity of foreclosure or the presence of the collec-
tor would be the event signaling the probability 
of experiencing the concrete harmful situation, 
and leads to predict more exactly a possibility of 
efficacious coping with its consequences. It is at 
this moment that an avoidance response (e.g., 
obtaining a deferral) might alleviate the feeling 
of distress generated by the threat; this episode 
of control of one of the specific threats might, 
in turn, become an element favoring some relief 
to the more general situation of pain generated 
by economic loss. In the particular situation of 
this illustration, clear external signals would be 
available to facilitate the process of analysis and 
decision-making, although the process would 
be blocked if the person failed to discriminate 
those singularities in the broader general con-
text of the pain produced by the economic loss 
that originated the crisis.
In another example, the death of a loved 
one, although it is too concrete and painful a 
fact in and of itself as to question its harming 
capability, it would demand more specificity at 
the moment of establishing the characteristics 
and more proximal causes of the distress as well 
as of the control responses, such as feelings of 
asphyxia when waking up, physical sensations in 
the chest, or feelings of hopelessness produced 
when remembering the deceased person and be-
coming conscious of his or her definitive passing 
away. In this case, the clarity that aversive feel-
ings are contingent to waking up or to the afore-
mentioned thoughts, determines that these two 
stimuli can become a warning signaling a pos-
sible action to be performed to prevent the onset 
of the experienced distress.  In this case, both the 
nature of distress and that of the possible warn-
ing stimuli are more difficult to establish than in 
the case of what happens in the example of eco-
nomic loss, as in this case we are dealing with 
internal events such as thoughts, waking up, 
physical sensations, and feelings.
As can be noticed in the examples provided, 
the CS by itself is a context in which a more mo-
lecular analysis is required in order to identify 
the singular properties of distress sensations and 
feelings, of their triggering stimuli, and of the 
anticipated consequences of control. This is the 
process that determines the cognitive essence 
and the importance of feedback loops between 
appraisal and the emotional pain response (see 
Figure 1), which provide the person with the ele-
ments of required information that will enable 
her to adopt some coping strategy following a 
course of control of pain, control of harm, or 
both, and to develop future expectations of ad-
aptation. These elements of information consti-
tute the essence of the motivational congruence 
(Martínez-Sánchez et al., 2002) that can increase 
within a CS, favoring adaptation and resolution 
of the crisis. This feedback assumes a more evi-
dent and objective manifestation, no longer an-
ticipatory, when a consequence of adaptation is 
produced which has retroactive implications by 
way of reappraisal loops which modify the origi-
nal primary and secondary appraisals.
Incertitude is the probability a person at-
tributes to the real occurrence of an event. An 
event (e.g., getting an extension to make a pay-
ment or losing a valuable item in the above 335
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mentioned example) can have a real probability 
of occurring, but this objective probability be-
comes a subjective probability by way of individ-
ual information processing, which is susceptible 
to the use of biases and heuristics, as well as to 
cognitive errors or distortions. When incerti-
tude increases, of course, the confusion in ap-
praisal increases whereas adaptation decreases. 
For example, in a crisis generated by the kidnap-
ping or disappearance of a loved one, incertitude 
about the event leads to a state of confusion in 
which it is quite difficult to perform control an-
ticipations and reasonable decision-making, be-
cause of the paralysis of any anticipatory coping 
process, and practically for the only thing the 
person can do is to prepare for the worst of the 
possible consequences.
4.  Temporal factors. These are aspects of 
temporal parameter referring to the temporal 
imminence, duration, and incertitude. Immi-
nence corresponds to the time elapsing during 
the anticipatory appraisal before the foreseen 
event will occur. During this period, the person 
makes primary and secondary appraisals influ-
encing her emotional state, which depends more 
on the type of appraisals than on the duration 
of anticipation. Just as an appraisal made during 
this period might lead to reducing the expecta-
tions of severity, it can also increase them, and 
just as it might lead to improving the efficacy 
expectations it can also worsen them. In a favor-
able case, there is a decrease in the emotional 
response and an increase in the probability of 
successful coping; in the contrary case, the so-
called incubation of anxiety (Chorot, 1991), can 
be produced, a process that predisposes even 
more to the deepening of the crisis.
Duration refers to the time during which 
the event originating the crisis continues. Fol-
lowing Lazarus and Folkman (1984b), in this pa-
per we adopt the viewpoint developed by Hans 
Selye (Bensabat, 1987; Selye, 1956) regarding the 
evolution of the General Adaptation Syndrome 
to describe the impact of the duration of the 
event and its evolution throughout the stages of 
alarm, resistance, and exhaustion, an approach 
that will be addressed again later. If the event 
continues in time, coping is what determines an 
evolution towards exhaustion or adaptation. Ex-
haustion is produced to the extent that the event 
happens to be inescapable and unavoidable, 
with no reductions in the primary appraisal of 
severity and susceptibility, and with no changes 
in the secondary appraisal about coping alterna-
tives. The passing of time involves modifications 
in these appraisals, both by way of its effect on 
memory and because of the effect of reappraisals 
coming from the adaptive result of the coping 
the person has attempted. Coping with a chronic 
event that has originated a crisis can become a 
challenge for the person, similar to the chal-
lenge of dealing with chronic physical pain, with 
the production of emotions more akin to those 
produced by the interpretation of challenge that 
favors the onset of instrumental situation man-
agement reactions, than to those produced by 
the interpretation of threat, which favors the on-
set of anxiety emotional reactions.
Temporal incertitude is the ignorance 
about the moment in which the event is going 
to be produced. In a CS, the triggering event has 
already occurred and, for this reason, temporal 
incertitude might be more related to the threat 
of new events, as in the case of an earthquake 
which might be followed by aftershocks. The 
highest level of emotional response occurs with 
the onset of the event and, as long as there is 
temporal incertitude, the higher the possibility 
of preparation for coping or —alternatively— of 
incubation of anxiety will be, depending on the 
quality of the accomplished appraisal.  
5. The chronology of events. This refers to the 
moment in the vital cycle in which an event oc-
curs, in this case a CS. Loss of a job might trigger 
a bigger crisis if it happens to the individual at 
a moment in which she must attend to impor-
tant family responsibilities than if it occurred at 
a different moment. An important fact is that a 336
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critical event modifies the sensitivity of the per-
son to other facts which, without the presence of 
a CS, might have a completely different mean-
ing. The chronology of the events influences 
considerably the commitment a person has to 
the particular event occurring in a CS.
6. The incertitude-ambiguity dynamics and 
its influence on coping. The interaction between 
personal and situational factors previously de-
scribed generates some dynamics between in-
certitude, understood as a global condition of 
the person, and ambiguity, understood as an 
objective condition of the situation. A contra-
diction is generated as a function of these dy-
namics, for whose solution the most feasible 
immediate alternative in a CS is the reduction 
of incertitude, insofar as the objective harm is a 
fact which has already occurred and entails little 
ambiguity, and whose control, in addition to the 
control of parallel threats, is the main source of 
personal incertitude and the main goal of situ-
ational management.
Emotional Experience during the crisis
In this section, we will analyze a funda-
mental aspect of a CS, understood as a state of 
great psycho-biological alteration, in which 
emotional experience plays an intermediate role, 
which follows cognitive appraisal and antecedes 
coping in a cyclic process directed by successive 
reappraisals.  
The perception of the triggering stimu-
lus during the crisis, the appraisal of its highly 
harmful and unpleasant character, and the in-
teraction between primary appraisals —repre-
senting the magnitude of what is at stake in the 
CS— and secondary appraisals —representing 
the possibilities of successful coping with the 
crisis— determine both the extent and the qual-
ity of the predominant emotional experience 
(Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). In DPP-CS this ex-
perience is conceptualized in a global manner as 
an intense, emotional state of pain, so as to refer 
to the natural function of the negative emotions 
experienced during a crisis, which essentially 
lead to the appearance of escape and/or avoid-
ance behaviors.
The label of emotional pain addressed to 
the subjective experience or feeling suffered in 
a CS emphasizes the harmful role of stimuli that 
usually trigger a crisis more than the isolated na-
ture of the experienced emotion, in a process in 
which the experienced distress becomes an ini-
tiating source of defensive reactions configuring 
the process of pain control and of protective re-
actions configuring the process of harm control.   
That complex state of emotional experience 
during a CS makes it adopt a syndrome-like na-
ture rather than one of pure expression of an iso-
lated emotion. The factor ruling the emotional 
predominance in one or the other sense (e.g., 
anxiety, depression, shame, guilt, or challenge) 
and providing conscious sense to the emotional 
experience during the evolution of the crisis can 
be located in the emotional cognitive attitude 
that is predominant in a particular moment. An 
emotional cognitive attitude (Martínez-Sánchez 
et al., 2002) is understood as a thought schema 
by which the meaning of some external event 
is filtered, anteceding a general emotional cat-
egory or syndrome mixing diverse emotions but 
assuming a dominant tone of emotional expres-
sion according to the meaning attributed by the 
filter to the emotional experience. In fact,  this 
cognitive filtering facilitates the onset of the 
emotion that is experienced and reported by the 
person as a conscious experience. Such emo-
tional cognitive attitudes include, among others, 
the filtering of irreversible loss underlying the 
sadness that, by prevailing and recurring, con-
stitutes a general emotional state of sub-clinical 
depression; the filtering of threat, which by pre-
vailing constitutes a general emotional state of 
anxiety; the filtering of offense, which by pre-
vailing determines an emotional state of anger; 
the filtering of defiance, which by prevailing de-
termines an emotional state of challenge; the fil-
tering of harm, which by prevailing determines 337
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an emotional state of fear; the filtering of loss 
of control, which by prevailing determines an 
emotional state of hopelessness; or the filtering 
of transgression, which by prevailing determines 
an emotional state of guilt. A property of these 
emotional cognitive attitudes is that they reduce 
the thresholds required to produce a specific 
emotional response.  
Some authors use these general emotional 
states to characterize the evolution of a CS (for 
example, Kübler-Ross, 1997, in her character-
ization of the stages of grief), although there is 
scarce empirical support regarding its systematic 
nature. Such an evolution occurs in response to 
changes in the initial appraisals by way of a pro-
cess of permanent reappraisal that is originated 
in the adaptive or maladaptive consequences re-
sulting from coping attempts successively made 
by the person, which is why the evolution con-
stitutes a variable process of coping stages and 
not a rigid and invariable sequence of emotion 
stages, which is not systematic either in indi-
viduals experiencing a CS. It makes more sense 
to argue that the emotional experience of anger 
advances the person towards adaptation insofar 
as it favors the filtering of the situation through 
a signification of challenge, than to argue that 
the anger stage is a systematic and necessary 
antecedent for adaptation. By the same token, it 
makes more sense to argue that the recurrence 
of the emotional experience of fear favors the fil-
tering through a signification of harm that leads 
the person to hopelessness and depression than 
to propose that the fear stage is followed by the 
depression stage in the adaptive cycle.
Emotions, characterized by the conscious 
experience of a feeling that allows a precise label-
ing of it, possess such a high motivational property 
that they have been used as a basis to differentiate 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, at-
tributing to underlying emotions the propelling 
property intrinsic of actions (Reeve, 2005; Vila 
& Fernández-Santaella, 2005). This motivational 
property of emotions (Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 
2000) is expressed by means of non-intentional 
behaviors (e.g., gestures) communicating to oth-
ers the emotional state, and intentional behaviors 
(avoidance, escape, approach, inaction —in the 
case of the depression—, etc.), which constitute 
the basis for subsequent coping, both instrumen-
tal coping focused on during the process of harm 
control, and emotional coping focused on during 
the process of pain control. Both of these pro-
cesses are necessary in the course of coping with a 
CS as they lead to necessary results for the attain-
ment of personal adaptation in the post-crisis.  
Emotional coping, by way of the process of 
pain control, is essential in CSs given that, fre-
quently, generated harms constitute irreversible 
losses, in the face of which any instrumental at-
tempt of change is of little help. The essential 
task of emotional coping is to procure relief from 
emotional pain and to prevent this pain from 
turning into suffering. Whereas it is difficult to 
make a distinction between these two emotions, 
they are two different emotional reactions (Min-
sky, 2006). Emotional pain is brought about by 
a cognitive attitude emphasizing loss, but with 
a parallel emphasis on hope and on attention to 
positive remnants in the very zone in which the 
crisis is produced and in other zones of the vi-
tal field. Alternatively, pain is susceptible to rea-
sonable management, as occurs in situations in 
which a person has to deal with chronic physical 
pain. A chronic emotional pain quite similar to 
chronic physical pain, which allows an illustra-
tion of our previous assertion, is the so-called 
“nostalgia” (Paniagua, 2010), where the evoca-
tion of memories and the expression of longings 
constitute the elements of cognitive appraisal 
contributing to the increase of pain, but also in 
which the challenge of living more in terms of 
the present rather than of the past corresponds 
to an adaptive challenge for the person. Suffering, 
on the contrary, constitutes an intensification of 
pain by way of cognitive appraisals magnifying 
loss and its consequences, highlighting the unfair 
characteristics of the crisis-triggering event, and 338
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generating attitudes of self-compassion leading 
even to transform the emotion into a tool for the 
attainment of secondary benefits.
Instrumental coping follows challenge ap-
praisals leading the person to experience a CS as 
a challenge, and is required particularly to pre-
vent objective threats of the appearance of new 
harms (“regardless of how bad a situation is, it 
can get worse”), to prevent the generalization of 
the crisis to new vital zones different from the 
original one, and to procure the objective mate-
rial conditions required to access new levels of 
post-crisis re-adaptation.
Brief Motivational interventions 
(BMI) in crisis situations
For reasons of space, this topic will be ad-
dressed in more detail in a different article (Gan-
tiva & Flórez, in press). Our aim here is merely to 
anticipate that the motivational formulation, pri-
or to BMI, is grounded in Riso’s proposal of cog-
nitive formulation by levels (2006). This layered 
(or by levels) formulation demands the identifi-
cation of the cognitive distortions (Level 1), the 
nuclear schemata (Level 2), and the second-order 
motivational schemata (Level 3), that play an es-
sential role in the development of the CS.  
In any CS the probability that the avail-
able information will generate incertitude in 
the person increases; in such a case, the role of 
situational ambiguity is mediated by subjective 
interpretations, with which the function of per-
sonal beliefs becomes more significant in the de-
termination of the course that coping will take. 
It is for this reason that the modification of these 
beliefs becomes more relevant as a substantial 
element of motivational intervention, which has 
the property of being brief in the sense that it is 
centered on the production of clear and simple 
coping decisions or intentions, as an initial step 
in the solution of a complex CS. The complemen-
tary aspect of BMI is the planning of personal 
self-control to secure the execution of the coping 
actions the person will decide to implement.
The clarity of the solution is a property re-
ferring to incertitude, as it alludes to the need 
that a person will purport true intentions, both 
in terms of her reinforcement-outcome expecta-
tions referring to the efficacy of action, and in 
terms of her self-efficacy expectations, regard-
less of the objective ambiguity the situation 
entails in itself. In this sense, the clarity of the 
solution has to lead to the double effect of in-
creasing the confidence in the possibility of con-
trolling harm or pain, and increasing individual 
confidence in the probability of effectively exert-
ing such control. Some examples of clear inten-
tions in a CS can be those of surviving, handling 
the pain, living without suffering, living in aus-
terity, enduring dearth, doing something almost 
unacceptable, and so on.
Simplicity is a property referring to the re-
quired conditions for the implementation of the 
solution, and refers to the intentions of implemen-
tation that, as pointed out by Gollwitzer (1999), 
need to be plain or simple in order to be potent, 
regardless of the objective situational ambiguity. 
These implementation intentions are the self-con-
trol conditions required for the person to carry 
out the effective actions of pain management, 
both in the emotional and instrumental ways of 
coping, leading to the dual processing of control 
of pain and control of harm, which in turn lead 
to a new state of personal adaptation, in the pres-
ence or absence of the triggering event of the cri-
sis, which might or might not be reversible. Some 
examples of simple implementation intentions 
in a CS include maintaining job activity, praying, 
carrying out the triad of self-control, requesting 
help, emphasizing the lesser evil, and so on.
Coherently with the previous argument, 
in  BMI procedures of cognitive restructuring 
such as motivational interviewing (Gantiva & 
Flórez, in press; Lizarraga & Ayarra, 2001; Miller 
& Rollnick, 1991) and Socratic dialogue (Mar-
tínez, 2009) are used as very useful alternatives 
with the aim of reducing a person’s incertitude 
regarding efficacy expectations of an action and 339
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her own self-efficacy expectations, leading her 
to the statement of general intentions of action.   
Procedures of self-control such as science (Ma-
honey & Mahoney, 1976) are also used as a very 
useful alternative to reduce ambiguity regarding 
the courses of action required to generate the 
dual process of coping.
Conclusions
A conceptual model has been developed 
which allows explaining the events occurring in 
a normal crisis situation —normal in the sense 
that it has not adopted the shape of a mental dis-
order—, and which allows orienting the coun-
seling to the person experiencing it with the 
aim of fostering her control of what occurs and 
the search for adaptation. The developed model 
has been labeled dual parallel process in crisis 
situations (DPP-CS), and three main theoretical 
and methodological sources were adopted for its 
design, as previously developed in the study of 
thematic fields akin to that of crisis:
1. The dual extended parallel process model, 
through which Witte (1992) provides an explan-
atory framework about what occurs when fear is 
taken as a determinant variable for the adoption 
of behaviors of avoidance of threats that become 
real unless such a behavior, suggested by way of 
a message, occurs. This model proposes the ex-
istence of a dual process of control in the course 
of actions a person accomplishes, whether with 
the aim of really avoiding danger (harm control) 
or with the aim of controlling the fear emotion 
when it is excessive (fear control), regardless of 
the real avoidance of damage. Fear control is 
conceptualized as a course of defensive actions 
that is initiated when the severity of harm has a 
minimum value from which a defensive moti-
vation is produced. Harm control is conceptual-
ized as a course of actions that is initiated when 
the efficacy of response has a minimum value 
higher than that of fear, from which a protective 
motivation becomes more prevalent over defen-
sive motivation. This theoretical source has been 
adopted by way of the characterization of a crisis 
as an event in which the occurrence of a harm-
ful event generates the experiencing of a highly-
intense negative emotional state, characterized 
in a generic way as emotional pain.
2. The interactive theory about stress and 
coping proposed by Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984b), which analyzes stress as a process of 
interaction between external or internal threat-
ening events and a person’s cognitive appraisal 
regarding the inherent harm to the event and 
regarding her own ability to deal with the threat. 
The cognitive appraisal is also analyzed as a dual 
process in which the intermediary variables 
that support it are established: on the one hand, 
primary appraisal, referring to perceptions of 
severity of the harm inherent to the threat, and 
of personal vulnerability or susceptibility to 
harm. On the other hand, secondary appraisal, 
referring to outcome expectations a person has, 
based on the efficacy attributed to the avoidance 
behaviors the person exhibits, and to personal 
self-efficacy expectations to these. Cognitive ap-
praisal is proposed in this model as the factor 
anteceding coping, which is a response process 
demanding active effort by the person to at-
tain stress management. This theory proposes 
cognitive reappraisal as a factor of change of 
the original appraisal, as a function of the ad-
aptation resulting from coping. This theoretical 
source has been adopted by way of the concep-
tualization of crisis as a severe stress state in 
which a deep alteration of motivations occurs, 
not only in the natural space proper to the crisis 
event, but in all the spaces forming the total vi-
tal field to which a person has a high degree of 
commitment.
3. The strategy of formulation by levels sug-
gested by Riso (2006) in his proposal about the 
theoretical and methodological foundations of 
cognitive therapy, which orients therapeutic ac-
tion by way of a triple configuration organized 
in the manner of levels, each of which incorpo-
rates some cognitive product or process.  Level 340
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1 describes automatic thoughts and cognitive 
distortions, which are cognitive-type products 
that are more accessible for the explanation of 
a disorder. Level 2 is formed by a dual system of 
information processing in which a central role 
is played by the cognitive economy through-
out the information processing under the lead 
of essential biases and heuristics on the one 
hand (System A), and by the information pro-
cessing under the lead of schemata which self-
perpetuate maladaptive schemata (System B), 
on the other. Level 3 is formed by ideological-
conceptual, evaluative, higher motivational, and 
constructive schemata. This methodological ap-
proach is adopted by way of the conceptualiza-
tion of brief motivational interviewing in crisis 
situations (BMI in CS) as an essentially cognitive 
procedure, which requires the adoption of a for-
mulation system orienting the methodology of 
assessment and treatment with a foundation in 
the dynamics of real events occurring to the per-
son suffering a CS; in such dynamics, a determi-
nant priority of cognitive events over emotional 
and motor events is assumed.  
The theoretical and methodological sourc-
es subsidizing the conceptualization of DPP-CS 
have a large tradition of empirical investigation 
supporting them in scientific psychology.  Nev-
ertheless, their integration as an explanatory 
model of crises is relatively new and requires 
the development of empirical studies verifying 
it; the novelty of the model is of a great interest 
regarding the addressing of a crisis in a normal 
stage of its development, when it has not yet as-
sumed pathological manifestations and as a field 
of application of BMI.
The development of empirical studies to 
support the DPP-CS model initially implies the 
development of measurement instruments ap-
plicable to the intermediary cognitive variables 
included in the model, as well as the measure-
ment of coping processes. In this respect, there 
are numerous antecedents in some traditional 
areas of psychological research such as stress 
and motivation, particularly in those fields deal-
ing with the application of motivational theories 
to the prevention of disease and the promotion 
of health.  Having these assessment instruments 
will make it possible to establish how appropri-
ate DPP-CS is as an explanatory model of what 
occurs during a CS. Likewise, these empirical 
studies imply the development of systematic 
experiences of proactive modification of what 
has occurred in a CS, in order to verify the pre-
dictions that can be made regarding treatment, 
whose characterization is made by way of BMI in 
CS, which includes essential procedures of cog-
nitive restructuring such as Socratic dialogue, of 
decision-making, as motivational interviewing, 
and of self-control of actions.
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